Concepts from Event Semantics in Cognition
- Alexis Wellwood, Northwestern University
- Jeremy Kuhn, École Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University Institut Jean Nicod (ENS, EHESS, CNRS)
- Philippe Schlenker, École Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University Institut Jean Nicod (ENS, EHESS, CNRS)
- Carlo Geraci, École Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University Institut Jean Nicod (ENS, EHESS, CNRS)
- Brent Strickland, École Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University Institut Jean Nicod (ENS, EHESS, CNRS)
- Susan Hespos, Northwestern University
- Lance Rips, Northwestern University
- E. Matthew Husband, University of Oxford
- Alexander Williams, University of Maryland
Abstract
Common sense intuition distinguishes between events and regular
objects; events happen, after all, and objects don't. This distinction is
deployed in linguistics, psychology and philosophy. Linguists say that sentences
describe events, while nouns describe objects. Psychologists describe the
principles of event perception, and philosophers debate the metaphysics of event
identity. But how do these various discussions relate to each other?
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